Liberation of Belarus (1944). The Great Patriotic War

After Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge the course of the Great Patriotic War was finally broken, the Red Army began to conquer its land. The Second World War was approaching endlessly. The liberation of Belarus was an important stage on the road to victory.

Winter Attempt

The first attempt to liberate Belarus was made in the winter of 1944. The offensive in the direction of Vitebsk began in early February, but it was unsuccessful: the advancement was difficult, for a month and a half it was possible to delve only by ten kilometers.

The Belorussian Front, operating in the Minsk-Bobruisk direction, did things better, but it was far from brilliant either. Here the offensive began even earlier, in early January, and already on the 14th, Mozyr and Kalinkovichi were taken. By the beginning of spring, Soviet troops forced the Dnieper and recaptured from the Nazis 20-25 km of territory.

The slow progress of the Red Army could not be considered particularly successful, so in the middle of spring the High Command decided to postpone the offensive. The troops were ordered to gain a foothold in the occupied positions and wait for better times.

Unlike the Belarusian direction, the large-scale winter-spring campaign of 1944 was quite successful: the southern edge of the front crossed the border, battles were fought outside the USSR. The affairs on the northern sector of the front were not bad: the Soviet troops were able to get Finland out of the war. For the summer, it was planned to liberate Belorussia, the Baltic republics and complete recapture of Ukraine.

Disposition

The front line in the BSSR was an arc (ledge, wedge) directed towards the Soviet Union with a length of 1,100 km. In the north, it was limited to Vitebsk, in the south - to Pinsk. Within this arc, called in the Soviet General Staff "a Belarusian ledge," German troops were stationed - the "Center" group, including the 3rd Panzer, 2nd, 4th and 9th Armies.

The German command attached great importance to its positions in Belarus. They were ordered to defend at any cost, so the liberation of Belarus was not at all an easy walk.

Moreover, in the spring of 1944, the Fuehrer did not consider the war as a lost battle at all, but he was fond of hopes, believing that if time was dragged, the coalition would collapse, and then the Soviet Union would surrender, exhausted by a long war.

After conducting a series of reconnaissance operations and analyzing the situation, the Wehrmacht decided that it would be better to wait for troubles from Ukraine and Romania: using the already conquered territory, the Red Army could deal a devastating blow and even repulse Germany's strategically important Ploiesti deposits.

Guided by these considerations, the fascists dragged the main forces to the south, believing that the liberation of Belarus is unlikely to begin so soon: neither the state of the enemy's forces nor the local conditions had any disposition to attack.

Military Tricks

The USSR carefully supported these false beliefs in the enemy. The fake defensive lines were built on the central section, the 3rd Ukrainian Front intensively imitated the movement of a dozen rifle divisions, an illusion was created that the tank formations stationed in Ukraine remained in place, while in reality they were hurriedly transferred to the central part of the offensive line . Numerous fraudulent manipulations were carried out to falsely inform the enemy, while in the meantime the Operation Bagration was preparing in the strictest secrecy: the liberation of Byelorussia was not far off.

On May 20, the General Staff completed the planning of the campaign. As a result, the Soviet command expected to achieve the following goals:

• To push the enemy away from Moscow;
• Wedged in between groups of Nazi armies and deprive them of communication with each other;
• Provide a foothold for the subsequent strikes against the enemy.

To achieve success, the Belarusian offensive operation was carefully planned, as much depends on its outcome: victory opened the way to Warsaw, and hence, to Berlin. The struggle was going to be serious, because in order to achieve the set goals it was necessary:

• To overcome a powerful system of enemy fortifications
• To force large rivers;
• Take strategically important positions;
• In the shortest possible lines to free Minsk from the fascists.

Approved plan

On May 22 and 23, the plan was discussed with the participation of the commanders of the fronts participating in the operation, and on May 30 it was finally approved. According to him, it was supposed:

• "Hole" the defense of the Germans in six places, taking advantage of the surprise attack and the power of the strike;
• To destroy the factions near Vitebsk and Bobruisk, which served as the "wings" of the Belarusian protuberance;
• After the breakthrough, move forward along a convergent trajectory in order to take as large as possible enemy forces.

Successful implementation of the plan actually put an end to the strength of the Wehrmacht in this sector and made possible the complete liberation of Byelorussia: 1944 was supposed to put an end to the torment of the population, which was full of the horrors of the war.

Main Event Participants

The largest offensive operation involved the forces of the Dnieper Military Flotilla and four fronts: the First Baltic and three Belorussian.

It is difficult to overestimate the enormous role played by partisan detachments in the operation: without their developed movement, the liberation of Byelorussia from the German fascist invaders would certainly take much more time and effort. During the so-called rail war, partisans managed to blow up almost 150,000 rails. This, of course, greatly complicated the life of the invaders, and in fact the trains were derailed, the ferries were destroyed, the communication equipment was spoiled, and many other daring diversions were committed. The guerrilla movement in Byelorussia was the most powerful in the territory of the USSR.

When the Bagration operation was being developed, the mission of the First Byelorussian Front under the command of Rokossovsky was considered particularly difficult. In the area of the Bobruisk direction, nature itself did not appear to be conducive to success-in this matter the high command of both sides was unanimous. And indeed, to advance with the use of tanks through impenetrable swamps is a difficult task, to put it mildly. But the Marshal insisted: the Germans do not expect an attack from this side, since they know about the existence of the mounds as well as ours. That's why the blow should be caused precisely from here.

Relation of forces

The fronts participating in the campaign were significantly strengthened. The railroad worked not for fear, but for conscience: in the course of preparation, a myriad of equipment and people were transported - all with the utmost secrecy.

Since the Germans decided to concentrate forces in the southern sector, the German army group "Center", opposed to the Red Army, numbered fewer people. Against 36.4 thousand Soviet guns and mortars - 9.5 thousand, against 5.2 thousand tanks and automatic control systems - 900 tanks and assault guns, against 5,3 thousand units of combat aviation - 1,350 aircraft.

The time of the beginning of the operation was kept in strictest secrecy. Until the very last moment, the Germans had absolutely no idea about the upcoming campaign. You can imagine what a stir the alarm got up when on the early morning of June 23 Operation Bagration finally began.

Surprise for the Fuhrer

The advance of fronts and armies was not uniform. For example, the strike force of the 1st Baltic (4th Army) was not able to crush the enemy with one violent onslaught. For the day of the operation, she was able to overcome only 5 km. But the Sixth Guards and Forty-third armies of fortune smiled: they "pierced" the enemy's defense and bypassed Vitebsk from the north-west. The Germans hastily retreated, leaving about 15 km. In the resulting gap, the tanks of the 1st corps immediately poured in.

The 3rd Byelorussian Front by forces of the 39th and 5th armies bypassed Vitebsk from the south, practically did not notice the river Luches and continued the offensive. The cauldron closed: on the first day of the operation, the Germans had only one chance to escape the encirclement: a twenty-kilometer wide corridor, which lasted only a short time, the trap shut in the village of Ostrovno.

In the Orsha direction of the Soviet soldiers, at first, a failure was expected: the German defense in this sector was very powerful, the enemy desperately, evil and defended with knowledge. Attempts to release Orsha were made in January and failed. In the winter, the battle was lost, but the war was not lost: Operation Bagration did not leave room for failure.

The 11th and 31st armies spent the whole day trying to make their way to the second line of the German defense. Meanwhile, the Fifth Panzer Army was waiting for its hour: in case of a successful breakthrough in the Orsha direction, it opened the way to Minsk.

The 2 nd Belorussian Front advanced smoothly and successfully to Mogilev. By the end of the first day of the fighting, a good bridgehead had been captured on the banks of the Dnieper.

On June 24, the operation for the liberation of Belarus began for the First Byelorussian Front, which began to fulfill its own combat mission: to move in the Bobruisk direction. Here the hopes for the surprise of the attack were fully justified: still, on this side the Germans did not expect trouble. The line of their defense was scattered and small.

In the Parichy area, only the strike group broke through 20 km - the tanks of the First Guards Corps immediately crept into the gap that had formed. The Germans retreated to Bobruisk. Pursuing them, the avant-garde already on June 25 was on the outskirts of the city.

In the Rogachev area, things were not so rosy at first: the enemy fiercely resisted, but when the direction of the strike was turned down to the north, things went more fun. On the third day after the start of the Soviet operation, the Germans realized that it was time to flee, but were late: the Soviet tanks were already deep behind enemy lines. On June 27, the trap slammed shut. In it were more than six divisions of the enemy, which two days later were completely destroyed.

Success

The offensive was impetuous. On June 26, the Red Army liberated Vitebsk, after the fierce battles the Nazis left Orshansk after the 27th, the 28th Soviet tanks were already in Borisov, which was completely cleared on July 1.

Under the Minsk, Vitebsk and Bobruisk 30 enemy divisions were killed. Twelve days after the beginning of the operation, the Soviet troops advanced 225-280 km, breaking one half of Belarus with one jerk.

To this development of events, the Wehrmacht was completely unprepared, and even the command of the army group "Center" itself was grossly and systematically mistaken. The account of time went on hours, and sometimes - for minutes. At first it was still possible to avoid encirclement, in time retreating to the river. Berezina and creating a new line of defense here. It is unlikely that in this case the liberation of Belarus would have taken place in two months. But Field Marshal Bush did not give the order in time. Whether his belief in the infallibility of Hitler's military calculations was so strong, whether the commander underestimated the strength of the enemy, but he fanatically fulfilled Hitler's order "to defend the Belarussian rally at all costs" and ruined his troops. 40,000 soldiers and officers, as well as 11 German generals who held high posts, were captured. The result, let's face it, is shameful.

Shocked by the successes of the enemy, the Germans feverishly corrected the situation: Bush was removed from his post, additional connections began to draw in Byelorussia. Seeing the trends, the Soviet command demanded to accelerate the offensive and occupy Minsk no later than July 8. The plan was overfulfilled: on 3 the capital of the republic was liberated, and the large forces of the Germans (105,000 soldiers and officers) east of the city are surrounded. The last country that many of them saw in their lives was Belarus. 1944 was collecting its bloody harvest: 70 thousand people were killed and about 35 thousand were to pass through the streets of the jubilant Soviet capital. The front of the enemy was gaping, there was nothing to eliminate the huge 400-kilometer gap that had been formed. The Germans took to flight.

Two stages of the operation

The operation "Bagration" consisted of two stages. The first began on June 23. At that time, it was necessary to break through the enemy's strategic front, to destroy the flank forces of the Belarussian rally. The blows of the fronts were to converge, gradually converging, at one point of the map. After achieving success, the tasks changed: it was necessary to urgently ensure the pursuit of the enemy and the expansion of the breakthrough line. On July 4, the USSR General Staff changed the initial plan, thereby completing the first stage of the campaign.

Instead of convergent trajectories there were divergent ones: the First Baltic Front moved in the direction of Siauliai, the 3rd Byelorussian was to liberate Vilnius and Lida, the second Byelorussian was to be Novogrudok, Grodno and Białystok. Rokossovsky went in the direction of Baranovichi and Brest, and after occupying the latter, he went to Lublin.

The second stage of Operation Bagration began on July 5. Soviet troops continued their rapid advance. By the middle of summer, the vanguards of the fronts began to force the Neman. Large bridgeheads were captured on the Vistula and the river. Narew. On July 16, the Red Army occupied Grodno, and 28 - Brest.

On August 29, the operation was completed. There were new steps to Victory.

Strategic importance

In its scope, Bagration is one of the most ambitious strategic offensive campaigns. In just 68 days, Belarus was liberated. 1944, indeed, put an end to the occupation of the republic. The Baltic territories were partially conquered, Soviet troops crossed the border and partially occupied Poland.

The defeat of the powerful army group "Center" was a great military and strategic success. 3 brigades and 17 enemy divisions were completely destroyed. 50 divisions lost more than half of its composition. The Soviet troops reached East Prussia, the archival German outpost.

The outcome of the operation contributed to a successful offensive in other areas, as well as the opening of a second front.

During the operation, the Germans lost about half a million people (killed, wounded and prisoners). The USSR also suffered serious losses in the amount of 765,815 people (178,507 killed, 587,308 injured). Soviet soldiers displayed miracles of heroism in order for the liberation of Byelorussia to take place. The year of the operation, however, like the entire period of the Patriotic War, was the time of a true people's feat. Many memorials and monuments have been installed on the territory of the republic. On the 21st kilometer of the Moskovskoye Highway, the Hill of Glory is erected . The monument crowning the embankment represents four bayonets, symbolizing the four fronts that carried out the campaign.

The significance of this local victory was so great that the Soviet government was going to establish a medal for the liberation of Belarus, but this did not happen later. Some sketches of the award are kept in the Minsk Museum of History of the Second World War.